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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Valarie Lynn Posey appeals from the magistrate court's order denying her 
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a law enforcement officer's 
warrantless entry into her house. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The facts underlying Posey's motion to suppress, based on the testimony 
of Coeur d'Alene police officer Shane Avriett, were set forth by the magistrate 
court as follows: 1 
[Officer Avriett] was on duty on the 24th of March, 2011. 
Approximately, 4:00 in the afternoon he responded to a call related 
to an accident near 4th Street, south of Interstate 90 .... 
He was coming from the north, so he was southbound. And 
his testimony - and then that's corroborated by the video that was 
taken in his patrol car, Defendant's A that was admitted into 
evidence. You can see him approach the scene of the accident. 
Now, you can't really see all of what he described verbally in his 
testimony here because of the obstructions that were at the scene 
there. But the Officer testified that there was a red car that had 
been northbound that had damage on the front fender and in the 
door area. There was, also, a gray SUV that had damage. 
There was, you know, people around in the area. A young 
girl, approximately of the age of 12 was near the island that had 
some plantings and whatnot on it, that was bleeding. 
The Officer put out some cones. He described the red car 
further as having additional damage, in that the airbags had been 
deployed. The front left wheel had been broken and was at a -
kind of a strange angle. And the driver of this red car was not 
present at the scene. 
1 During oral argument in her appeal to the district court, Posey said she did not 
take issue with any of the magistrate court's factual findings (Tr., 2/29/12, p.12, 
Ls.6-8), and appears to maintain that position on appeal (Appellant's Brief, p.2). 
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Now, Officer Morgan and some other witnesses that were at 
the scene indicated that the driver had left the scene, westbound, 
apparently on foot. 
Officer Avriett was in additional communication with 
Dispatch. They relayed some additional information to him about 
the driver, indicated it was a female. 
There was a reporting party. Now, we didn't get the name of 
that individual here on the record, but the impression that I got is 
that, you know, law enforcement did get the name of that individual 
and other identifying information. And we could see the individual 
on the -- at one point on the video. 
But that this reporting party had apparently followed the 
driver of the vehicle from the location of the accident to another 
location over near Government way and relayed that information to 
lawenforcement. That was then relayed to officer Avriett. So, he 
then left the accident scene to go over the few blocks over to 
Government Way to see if he could contact the driver of the 
vehicle. As he got to the area in question on Government Way, this 
reporting party flagged him down. You could kind of see it on the 
video. And indicated that the woman had gone into the house. 
And there was -- you know, he pointed out the house. 
And the officer went to the door. Knocked on the door 
several times. There's no answer. Contacted Dispatch to see if 
they had a phone number for that particular address. And I think 
the description was 2202 Government Way. The officer heard no 
movements, no voices inside. 
He wanted to contact a supervisor to see if it would be 
appropriate or to get approval to break the door down. 
Now, right around in this area some additional conversation 
is taking place between the officer and the reporting party. This 
reporting party, you can hear him indicate there that the woman 
appeared to be "out of it". She was bleeding from the face. She 
went into the house. The reporting party, also, indicated that when 
he was still at the scene of the accident that the woman had tried 
to, you know, get the car going again. The individual stopped the 
individual from going and took the keys away, and then had 
followed her over to this residential location where she went into the 
house. 
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All right. The supervisor is contacted, approves of the officer 
breaching the door. The officer had tried to kick the door open, was 
unable to do that. The Fire Department arrived with a large sledge 
hammer. And the officer used that, got in the door by breaking it 
down. Further warnings were given prior to that occurring and the 
door still didn't open. 
When he did go in through the front door, saw an elderly 
gentleman there. Asked where the female was. At some point it 
was pointed out that this female was behind another -- either this 
door or some other door. She was holding a cloth to her face. 
Officer Avriett identified this individual as being the 
defendant in this case here in open court. She was instructed to go 
outside. She appeared dazed and confused. She declined medical 
attention, but her nose was cut, possibly broken. She had cuts on 
her face, a black eye. 
(Mot. Tr., p.41, L.25 - p.45, L.5.2) 
Officer Avriett noticed that Posey had a strong odor of alcohol on her 
breath, and after she first told him she had had a few beers, she said she had 
four beers at a bar. (R., p.15.) Officer Avriett placed Posey under arrest after 
she failed to satisfactorily perform field sobriety tests. (Id.) Posey was taken to 
Kootenai Medical Center to be evaluated because she had previously refused 
medical treatment, and provided a blood sample which showed her blood alcohol 
content was .34. (R., pp.16-17, 39-40.) Posey was charged in an amended 
criminal complaint with (1) excessive DUI (.20 or higher BAC), (2) failure to 
purchase/invalid license, (3) transporting an open alcohol container, and (4) 
leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a vehicle. (R., pp.39-40.) 
Posey filed a motion to suppress based upon the federal and state 
constitutions, claiming that Officer Avriett's entry into her house was not justified 
2 The May 27, 2011 hearing on Posey's motion to suppress will be referred to as 
"Mot. Tr." 
3 
by any exception to the warrant requirement. (R, pp.41-41.) After a hearing on 
Posey's motion, the magistrate judge issued a verbal ruling denying Posey's 
suppression motion, followed by a written order, finding the officer's entry into 
Posey's house was justified as an appropriate use of the community caretaking 
function to check on Posey's condition. (See generally Mot. Tr.; R, pp.54-55.) 
Posey appealed the magistrate's decision to the district court. (R, pp.73-
75.) After briefing and oral argument (R, pp.107-149; see generally Tr., 
2/29/12), the district court affirmed the magistrate court's order denying Posey's 
motion to suppress based upon the community caretaking exception to the 
warrant requirement (R, pp.175-183). Posey filed a timely appeal from the 
district court's appellate order. (R., pp.188-191.) 
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ISSUES 
Posey states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Is there an applicable exception to the warrant requirement 
that justified the police officer's entry into Posey's home? 
2. If the entry into Posey's home was unlawful, should the 
evidence obtained thereby be excluded? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.g.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 




Posey Has Failed To Show Error In The Magistrate Court's Denial Of Her Motion 
To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Posey asserts the magistrate court erred in denying her motion to 
suppress, contending: (1) the "community caretaking function is not applicable to 
an officer's entry into a person's home" (Appellant's Brief, p.17), (2) the 
community caretaking doctrine is inapplicable because Officer Avriett's entrance 
into Posey's house was not "totally divorced" from the detection, investigation, or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute (citing Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973» (id., pp.11-16, 18-20), (3) even if the 
community caretaking doctrine is applicable, the officer's entrance into Posey's 
home was unreasonable (id., pp.18-19), and (4) because the officer's entry into 
Posey's home was unlawful, the evidence obtained should be excluded under 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the even broader 
protections of Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution (id., pp.20-26). 
Posey's arguments fail. Application of the law to the facts shows the 
magistrate court correctly concluded that Officer Avriett's actions in this case 
were constitutionally reasonable for purposes of both the federal and state 
constitutions. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from the decision of a district court sitting in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the appellate court reviews the magistrate's ruling 
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independently, giving due consideration, but not deference, to the district court's 
appellate determination. State v. Suiter, 138 Idaho 13, 15, 56 P.3d 775, 777 
(2002); State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 818, 10 P.3d 1285, 1287 (2000), 
overruled on other grounds, State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 88 P.3d 704 (2004). 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by sUbstantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
C. Posey Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of Her 
Suppression Motion 
Posey asserts "Officer Avriett's conduct of breaking open [her] front door 
with a sledge hammer to gain entry was not reasonable." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.19.) The magistrate court denied her suppression motion, finding that the 
totality of the circumstances, and especially the information provided by the 
reporting party who followed Posey as she walked to her house after the accident 
- i.e., Posey was completely "out of it" and was bleeding from the face- justified 
the officer's entry into Posey's home as a community caretaking function: 3 (Mot. 
Tr., p.45, Ls.7-11; p.47, Ls.19-24; see id., p.8, Ls.8-15.) The court explained: 
Under the circumstances here, I'm constrained to find that 
this is an appropriate use of the community caretaking function. 
3 In addition to asserting the community caretaking function exception to the 
warrant requirement, the prosecutor argued that the "exigent circumstances" 
exception justified the officer's entry into Posey's home. (Mot. Tr., p.32, Ls17-
25.) That basis for denying Posey's suppression motion was rejected by the 
magistrate court. (Mot. Tr., p.45, Ls.15-19.) 
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That he did have evidence indicating that the person was injured, 
was "out of it", bleeding. The Officer didn't know the extent of the 
injuries. If this young lady had gone into the house and expired, the 
Officer would have been liable for not doing something about that. 
So, I feel that the community caretaking function, under the 
totality of the circumstances with everything that the Officer had 
available to him at that time, was appropriate here. That the search 
at that point to see what her condition was, and to talk to her, and 
see if she needed any further help was appropriate. 
(Mot. Tr., p.48, Ls.12-23.) 
"[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citations omitted). Thus, for 
example, a warrant is not required where "the exigencies of the situation make 
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." kL. (citations and 
quotations omitted). 'The reasonableness standard imposed by the Fourth 
Amendment requires that the nature of the intrusion upon the individual's privacy 
interest be balanced against the public need and governmental interest promoted 
by the action taken." State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 217 
(2003) (citations omitted). Reasonableness is assessed based on the totality of 
the circumstances. kL. Courts have repeatedly recognized that members of law 
enforcement do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they take action 
consistent with their community caretaking function. kL. 
The community caretaking function involves the duty of the police to help 
individuals that officers believe are in need of immediate assistance. State v. 
Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) (citing In re Clayton, 
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113 Idaho 817, 748 P.2d 401 (1988». "In analyzing community caretaking 
function cases, Idaho courts have adopted a totality of the circumstances test." 
.!sL. "The constitutional standard in community caretaking function cases is 
whether intrusive action of police was reasonable in view of all surrounding 
circumstances." Wixom, 130 Idaho at 754, 947 P.2d at 1002 (quoting State v. 
Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 867, 893 P.2d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 1995» (brackets 
omitted). 
Posey asserts the community caretaking exception to the warrant 
requirement does not apply to an officer's entry into a home - vis-a-vis a vehicle. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.) However, the emergency aid doctrine is 
encompassed within the community caretaking function, and has been applied to 
cases involving warrantless entries into homes. Barrett, 138 Idaho at 292, 295, 
62 P.3d at 216, 219 (explaining that Idaho "treats the emergency aid doctrine 
within the community care-taking function exception"); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 
432, 925 P.2d 1131 (Ct. App. 1996) (need to prevent risk of violence to 
defendant's girlfriend and child justified warrantless entry into defendant's 
residence as "exigent circumstances"); see Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 
(2006).4 Posey's assertion that Officer Avriett's entry into her home cannot be 
4 In Brigham City, officers entered a home after seeing a "melee" inside that 
involved "four adults [who] were attempting, with some difficulty to restrain a 
juvenile." 547 U.S. at 401. "The juvenile eventually broke free, swung a fist and 
struck one of the adults in the face," drawing blood. .!sL. (quotations omitted). 
"The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him against a 
refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor." 
.!sL. It was only then that an officer "opened the screen door and announced the 
officers' presence." .!sL. The Court concluded the officers behaved reasonably 
under the emergency aid doctrine in entering the residence, noting that the 
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justified as a community caretaking function, which includes the emergency aid 
doctrine, is not accurate. 
Posey also relies upon a comment by the Supreme Court in Cady, 413 
U.S. at 441, that police officers "frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which 
there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, 
may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the 
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 
criminal statute." (Appellant's Brief, p.13 (emphasis by Appellant.) Although 
Posey appears to argue that Cady's comment means that a police officer's 
subjective motives or expectations while engaged in a community caretaking 
function must be totally divorced from any hope or expectation of detecting or 
investigating criminality (see id., pp.13-15), it is the community caretaking 
function itself that the Court alluded to as being totally divorced from a criminal 
investigation or detection - not an officer's subjective motives or intent. Contrary 
to Posey's argument (see id., pp.14-15), the "additional language" in several 
Idaho cases which explains that an "officer may harbor at least an expectation of 
detecting or finding evidence of a crime" when engaged in a community 
officer "opened the screen door and yelled in police" and only entered to 
announce the officers' presence "[w]hen nobody heard him." Brigham City, 547 
U.S. at 406. The Court reasoned that the officer's conduct "was probably the 
only option that had even a chance of rising above the din," and was 
constitutionally reasonable under the circumstances. kt at 406-07. The Court 
further noted "it would serve no purpose to require them to stand dumbly at the 
door awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their 
presence." 
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caretaking function, is appropriate and is not at odds with the Cady decision.5 
See State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442,445,34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 2001); 
State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301,304,47 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Ct. App. 2002). 
The emergency aid doctrine allows law enforcement to make a 
warrantless entry into a place protected by the Fourth Amendment when there is 
a "need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such 
injury." Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (citations omitted). "An action is 
5 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the relationship between the 
community caretaking and exigent circumstances doctrines in Hunsberger v. 
Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009), and adopted the objective standard of 
the latter doctrine, explaining: 
The parties suggest that Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 
398 ... (2006), might collapse the distinction between the two 
doctrines. In upholding a warrantless home entry pursuant to a 
claimed exigency, the Court in Stuart made clear that in general "an 
action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of 
the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the circumstances, 
viewed objectively,'" support the action. Id. at 404, ... (quoting 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 ... (1978)). "The officer's 
subjective motivation is irrelevant." Id. See also Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 ... (1996). This holding initially seems 
in some tension with Dombrowski, which requires a court to 
determine whether a police officer was engaged in a function 
"totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." 413 U.S. at 
441 . . .. However, the Court in Stuart also made clear that '''an 
inquiry into programmatic purpose' is sometimes appropriate." 547 
U.S. at 405 ... (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,46 .. 
. (2000)). We think the best reading of the relationship between the 
two exceptions is that when analyzing a search made as the result 
of a routine police procedure, such as the policy of locating 
weapons in towed cars in Dombrowski, the court should examine 
the programmatic purpose of the policy - whether it was animated 
by community care-taking considerations or by law enforcement 
concerns. But when the search in question was performed by a law 
enforcement officer responding to an emergency, and not as part of 
a standardized procedure, the exigent circumstances analysis and 
its accompanying objective standard should apply. 
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'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's 
state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the 
action." ~ at 404 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) 
(emphasis original, brackets omitted). "The officer's subjective motive is 
irrelevant." Brigham City at 404 (citation omitted). 
This case is factually analogous to Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 62 P.3d 214. 
In Barrett, law enforcement responded to a report of a man who was collapsed 
on his front porch and unresponsive. ~ at 292, 62 P.3d at 216. A neighbor 
advised the officer that Barrett lived with his wife and two children but that he had 
not seen them that day. kL. Because Barrett did not respond to questions about 
whether there was anyone else in the house, the officers on scene "proceeded to 
Barrett's house and identified themselves loudly several times, asking any 
persons inside to come to the front door." kL. "[G]etting no response and hearing 
nothing from inside," and concerned that Barrett's wife and children could be 
inside and in need of medical assistance, the officers entered the residence. ~ 
Once inside, the officers did not find any other occupants, but they did find 
paraphernalia and heroin in plain view. kL. 
On appeal, Barrett challenged the denial of his suppression motion. 
Barrett, 138 Idaho at 293, 62 P.3d at 217. The Court of Appeals upheld the 
district court's order denying Barrett's motion, concluding: 
Under the totality of the facts and circumstances as known to 
the police at the time that they entered Barrett's house, and 
reasonable inferences drawn thereupon, we conclude that there 
existed a compelling need for the police to enter. The state has 
satisfied its burden to show that the risk of danger to persons inside 
the dwelling, as then reasonably perceived by police, constituted an 
12 
exigency justifying that warrantless entry. Here, the state's claim of 
exigency is not a mere pretext for an unlawful entry and search, but 
the police officers legitimately believed, particularly in view of their 
inability to discern the cause of the medical condition affecting 
Barrett, that the life of any occupants of Barrett's house may very 
well have been at stake. Because the' police officers were still in 
the process of searching downstairs for persons in need of 
assistance, the exigent circumstances had not ceased to exist 
when [an officer] observed the drug evidence in plain view in the 
kitchen. 
Barrett, 138 Idaho at 294-95,62 P.3d at 218-19; see State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 
432, 925 P.2d 1131 (Ct. App. 1996) (need to prevent risk of violence to 
defendant's girlfriend and child justified warrantless entry into defendant's 
residence as "exigent circumstances"). 
As in Barrett, and regardless of whether designated "emergency aid" or 
"community caretaking," there was a "compelling need for the police to enter" 
Posey's home. The magistrate summarized the facts showing it was reasonable 
for Officer Avriett to enter Posey's home in order to find out if she needed 
medical attention: 
... [C]learly there's an accident involved. Clearly people are 
injured. We have the 12 year old that's injured there at the scene. 
We've got airbags deployed. Severe damage to the red car. 
The driver of the vehicle is gone. A reporting following [sic] 
them over to another location, after the person tried to get the car 
doing [sic] again, even though the car is clearly not drivable at that 
point. Has to take the keys away from the person. Describes the 
person to the Officer as being "out of if', bleeding from the face. 
So, you know, the Officer, I think, reasonably, under these 
circumstances, has a belief that the individual is need [sic] of 
immediate assistance. Okay. 
(Mot. Tr., pA7, L.16 - p. 48, L.2.) Based on the totality of the circumstances, 
especially the reporting party's statement that the driver of the red car that was 
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involved in the accident looked "out of it," was bleeding from her face, and had 
walked away from the accident scene and into a house, the magistrate court 
correctly found that Officer Avriett had a legitimate basis for concern that Posey 
could have been in need of medical assistance. 
Posey next argues that "breaking open [her] front door with a sledge 
hammer to gain entry was not reasonable" (Appellant's Brief, p.19), apparently 
contending that the use of a sledge hammer to open the door was unreasonable. 
The magistrate found Officer Avriett's use of a sledge hammer to open the door 
reasonable under the circumstances, concluding: 
Now, does that warrant using a sledge hammer to get in the 
front door? That's - I'm struggling a little bit with that part of it 
there. That is way at the end of what might be considered 
reasonable in going into somebody's house. 
The Officer did knock several times. Called out. Indicated 
police were there. Got the permission and all of that. I think he did 
everything he could. 
(Mot. Tr., pA8, Ls.3-11.) The suppression testimony of Officer Avriett supports 
the magistrate's finding. Officer Avriett testified that he knocked on the door a 
few times and received no answer, and then he contacted his supervisor and 
received permission to enter the house. (Mot. Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.10, L.19.) Next, 
the officer loudly announced "Coeur d'Alene Police, open the door," and tried 
unsuccessfully to kick the door open five or six times. (Mot. Tr., p.10, L.25 -
p.11, L.21.) At that point, Fire Department personnel provided the officer with a 
sledge hammer, and he commanded two or three times, "Step away from the 
door," and then struck the door with the sledge hammer, opening it. (Mot. Tr., 
p.12, L.2 - p.13, L.21.) Under the circumstances, and considering that Officer 
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Avriett shouted out warnings and tried to breach the door by first kicking it, 
resorting to using a sledge hammer to open the door was reasonable. 
Posey has failed to demonstrate that law enforcement acted unreasonably 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment by entering her home to ensure the safety 
of whoever had been injured in the vehicle accident. Because the officer was 
lawfully in the process of ascertaining Posey's well-being when he noticed the 
odor of alcohol on her breath, which led to other evidence that she was under the 
influence of alcohol, there was no Fourth Amendment violation requiring 
suppression of any evidence. Posey has therefore failed to demonstrate error in 
the magistrate court's denial of her motion to suppress. 
Lastly, Posey asserts that, even if Officer Avriett's entry into her home was 
constitutional under the federal constitution, it was nonetheless unconstitutional 
under the broader protections of Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.22-25.) However, apart from pointing out that Article 1, § 
17 may be interpreted more broadly than the Fourth Amendment, Posey 
presents no "cogent reason why our state constitution should be applied 
differently" than the federal constitution. State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130, 
982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999). Posey does not cite any textual or structural 
differences between the federal and state constitution, list any matters of 
particular state interest or local concern, public attitudes, or state traditions that 
might support an argument for interpreting the Idaho law on warrantless home 
entries based on exigent circumstances, emergency aid, or community 
caretaking, any differently than the federal constitutional provision. See State v. 
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Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992) (Bistline, J., 
concurring). Therefore, this Court should view the state constitution coextensive 
with the federal constitution for the purpose of considering whether Officer 
Avriett's warrantless entry into Posey's home was unconstitutional, and conclude 
it was not. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the magistrate court's 
order denying Posey's motion to suppress. 
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